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Probabilistic model checkers like PRISM only check probabilistic systems of a fixed size. To guar-
antee the desired properties for an arbitrary size, mathematical analysis is necessary. We show for
two case studies how this can be done in the interactive proof assistant Isabelle/HOL. The first case
study is a detailed description of how we verified properties of the ZeroConf protocol, a decentral ad-
dress allocation protocol. The second case study shows the more involved verification of anonymity
properties of the Crowds protocol, an anonymizing protocol.
1 Introduction
The predominant approach to verification of probabilistic systems is model checking [4], and the most
popular model checker is PRISM [17]. Model checking is automatic, but restricted to fixed finite models.
In this paper we put forward interactive theorem proving as a realistic alternative approach that can deal
with infinite-state systems on an abstract mathematical level of Markov chains. The specific contributions
of this paper are two case studies that illustrate our approach: the ZeroConf protocol for decentralized
address allocation and the anonymizing Crowds protocol. The verifications are carried out in the proof
assistant Isabelle/HOL [21].
The characteristics of the theorem proving approach are:
• It can deal with infinite-state systems, although this paper considers only parameterized finite-state
systems.
• It is not restricted to some fixed set of concepts but user-extensible.
• Logical soundness of the system depends only on the soundness of a small fixed and trustworthy
kernel of the theorem prover.
• It requires familiarity with a theorem prover and a problem-dependent amount of work for each
verification.
In a nutshell, it is mathematics, but checked by a computer. These characteristics indicate that the
approach is more suitable for a research environment than a product development environment.
2 Formalization of probability in Isabelle/HOL
To reason about Markov chains, especially about the probability that a path is in a certain set, requires
measure and probability theory. This section gives a short introduction into the formalization of the
theories required by this paper. For a more detailed overview of the measure space formalization see
Hölzl and Heller [11], and for the formalization of Markov chains see Hölzl and Nipkow [12].
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2.1 Isabelle/HOL notation
Isabelle/HOL largely follows ordinary mathematical notation. With a few exceptions, we follow Is-
abelle/HOL notation in this paper, to give the reader a better impression of the look-and-feel of the
work. HOL is based on λ-calculus. Hence functions are usually curried (τ1 → τ2 → τ3 rather than
τ1× τ2 → τ3) and function application is written f a rather than f (a). The letters α and β stand for type
variables. Type B is the type of boolean values. Type τ set is the type of sets with elements of type τ.
Notation t :: τ means that t is a term of type τ. We regard functions of type N→ τ as infinite sequences
of elements of type τ. Prepending an element a :: τ to a sequence ω :: N→ τ is written a ·ω and means
λi. if i = 0 then a else ω (i−1). The term LEAST n. P n is the least natural number n such that P n holds.
If there is no such n, then the term has some arbitrary (defined!) value, but we do not know which.
2.2 Probability space
In this paper we are only interested in probabilities, hence we write measures as Prs :: α set → R, where
s indicates the particular probability measure under consideration. Similarly for the measurable sets we
write As :: α set set and for the entire space we write Ωs :: α set. Here α is an arbitrary type where we
cut out a space Ωs. This is necessary as in many cases we are only interested in a subset of the entire
type, e.g. α is the type of natural numbers N and we want to have a distribution on the finite subset
Ωs = {0, . . . ,N}. We usually drop Ωs and write {ω | P ω} instead of {ω ∈ Ωs | P ω} and Prs(ω. P ω)
instead of Prs {ω ∈Ωs. P ω}.
The measurable sets As form a σ-algebra, hence they are closed under conjunction, disjunction,
negation and countably bounded universal and existential quantification. We have the defining properties
on the probability measure Prs, as Prs /0 = 0, Prs Ωs = 1, it is non-negative: 0 ≤ Prs A and countably
additive: For a measurable and disjoint family P :: N→ α→ B
Prs(ω. ∃i. P i ω) = (∑i Prs(ω. P i ω)) .
For a finite probability space measurable sets need only be closed under finite bounded quantifiers,
and the probability needs only be finitely additive, instead of countably additive. Unfortunately, the
path space on Markov chains is neither finite nor discrete, so we need σ-algebras and countably additive
probability measures.
We also need conditional probability and define it as usual:
Prs(ω. P ω | Q ω) = Prs(ω. P ω∧Q ω)/Prs(ω. Q ω) .
The AE-quantifier AEsω. P ω on a path measure Prs states that the property P holds with probabil-
ity 1. Isabelle/HOL also has a formalization of the Lebesgue integral on probability spaces, as notation
we use
∫
ω f ω dPrs.
2.3 Markov chains
We introduce Markov chains as probabilistic automata, i.e. as discrete-time time-homogeneous finite-
space Markov processes. A Markov chain is defined by its state space S :: α set and an associated
transition matrix τ :: α → α→ R. We assume no initial distribution or starting state, however when
measuring paths we always provide a starting state. A path on a Markov chain is a function N→ S , i.e.
an infinite sequence of states visited in the Markov chain.
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markov-chain S τ= finite S ∧S 6= /0∧
(
∀s, s′ ∈ S . 0 ≤ τ s s′
)
∧
(
∀s ∈ S .
( ∑
s′∈S
τ s s′
)
= 1
)
For the rest of this section we assume a Markov chain with state space S and transition matrix τ. We
write E(s) for the set of all successor states, i.e. all s′ ∈ S with τ s s′ 6= 0. Note that a path ω does not
require that ω (i+1) is a successor of ω i.
We have defined a probability space (N→ S ,A,Prs) on the space of all paths N→ S for a starting
state s ∈ S . The measurable sets are the σ-algebra generated by all sets {ω ∈ N→ S | ω i = t} where
i ∈ N and t ∈ S . The measure Prs (depending on the starting state s ∈ S and τ) is defined via an infinite
product and is shown to satisfy the following key property (where s·ω prepends s to ω):
∀ω ∈ N→ S , s ∈ S ,n. Prs {ω′ | ∀i < n. ω′ i = ω i}= ∏i<n τ ((s·ω) i) (ω i)
Note that Prs explicitly carries the starting state and yields the transition probability for the steps s →τ
ω 0→τ ω 1→τ · · · →τ ω (n−1).
We also use Markov reward chains, where we assign a cost or reward to each transitions:
markov-reward-chain S τ ρ= markov-chain S τ∧ (∀s, s′ ∈ S . 0 ≤ ρ s s′)
This approach allows a very easy definition of a Markov chain given as a transition system. Other
formalizations of Markov chains [13, 19] use the probability space N→ B. This requires to provide a
measurable function X t ω, mapping a sequence of boolean choices ω :: N→ B into a state at time t. In
our approach the set of states S and the transition matrix τ are enough.
Some models require an arbitrary set I of independent variables Xi with distribution Pi. For this case
we provide the product ∏I Pi. We use this product space to construct the path space for our Markov
chains. Furthermore the probability space N→ B is just a special instance of the generalized product
space.
2.3.1 Iterative equations
The Markov chain induces iterative equations on the probability Prs, the Lebesgue integral and the AE-
quantifier, relating properties about s to properties of E(s). These equations are often useful in inductive
proofs and already give a hint how to prove concrete properties of probabilities and integrals. If A, P,
and f are measurable and s ∈ S , then the following equations hold:
Prs A = ∑
s′∈E(s)
τ s s′ ∗Pr s′(ω. s′·ω ∈ A)
∫
ω
f ω dPr s = ∑
s′∈E(s)
τ s s′ ∗
∫
ω
f (s′·ω) dPr s′
AEsω. P ω = ∀s′ ∈ E(s). AEs′ω. P (s′·ω)
2.3.2 Reachability
Let Φ be a subset of S . A state s′ is reachable via Φ starting in s iff there is a non-zero probability to
reach s′ by only going through the specific set of states Φ. The starting state s and the final state s′ need
not be in Φ.
reachable Φ s := {s′ ∈ S | ∃ω ∈ Ω,n. (∀i≤ n. ω i ∈ E((s·ω) i)) ∧
(∀i < n. ω i ∈ Φ)∧ω n = s′}
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Reachability is a purely qualitative property, as it is defined on the graph of non-zero transitions.
The until-operator introduces a similar concept on paths. Its definition does not assume that a state
is a successor state of the previous one, as this is already ensured by Prs.
until Φ Ψ = {ω | ∃n. (∀i < n. ω i ∈Φ)∧ω n ∈ Ψ}
Can we compute Prs(until Φ Ψ) using only reachable? It is easy to show that Prs(until Φ Ψ) = 0
iff (reachable Φ s)∩Ψ = /0. But is there also a way to characterize Prs(until Φ Ψ) = 1 in terms of
reachable?
2.3.3 Fairness
To show that reachable can be used to guarantee that states are reached with probability 1, we need state
fairness. A path ω is state fair w.r.t. s and t if s appears only finitely often provided that t also appears
only finitely often as the successor of s in ω. The definition and proofs about state fairness are based on
the thesis by Baier [3].
fair s t =
{
ω | finite {n | ω n = s∧ω (n+1) = t} =⇒ finite {n | ω n = s}
}
We show that almost every path is state fair for each state and its successors.
∀s, s′ ∈ S , t′ ∈ E(s′). AEsω. s·ω ∈ fair s′ t′
Using this we prove that starting in a state s almost every path fulfills until Φ Ψ if (1) all states
reachable via Φ are in Φ or Ψ and (2) each state reachable from s has the possibility to reach Ψ. This
theorem allows us to prove that until Φ Ψ holds almost everywhere by a reachability analysis on the
graph:
s ∈ Φ ∧ Φ ⊆ S ∧ reachable (Φ\Ψ) s⊆ Φ∪Ψ ∧
∀t ∈ (reachable (Φ\Ψ) s∪{s})\Ψ. reachable (Φ\Ψ) t∩Ψ 6= /0
=⇒ AEsω. s·ω ∈ until Φ Ψ
2.3.4 Hitting time
The hitting time on a path ω is the first index at which a state from a set Φ occurs:
hitting-time Φ ω= LEAST i. ω i ∈ Φ
Note that if there is no i such that ω i∈Φ, then hitting-time Φ ω is some arbitrary, underspecified natural
number. For the computation of rewards it is important to know if the expected hitting time is finite. We
show that the expected hitting time of Φ for paths starting in s is finite if almost every path starting in s
reaches Φ. If s is in S and AEsω. s·ω ∈ until S Φ then
∫
ω
hitting-time Φ (s·ω)dPr s 6= ∞
For Markov reward chains we are interested in the transition costs until a set of states occurs:
cost-until Φ ω= if ∃i. ω i ∈ Φ then ∑i<hitting-time Φ ω ρ (ω i) (ω (i+1)) else ∞
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3 Case study: The ZeroConf protocol
Ad-hoc networks usually do not have a central address authority assigning addresses to new nodes in the
network. An example are consumer networks where users want to connect their laptops to exchange data
or attach a network capable printer. When connecting with WiFi these devices use IPv4 and hence need
IPv4 addresses to communicate with each other.
The ZeroConf protocol [6] is a distributed network protocol which allows new hosts in the network
to allocate an unused link-local IPv4 address. A link-local address is only valid in the local network, e.g.
a WiFi network. We assume point-to-point communication in our local network, and hence communi-
cate directly with each host identified by a valid address. The problem with IPv4 addresses is that they
are limited, i.e. they are represented by 32-bit numbers, and for the local network the addresses from
169.254.1.0 to 169.254.254.255 are available, hence we can chose from 65024 distinct addresses. Zero-
Conf works by randomly selecting an address from this pool and then probing if the address is already
in use.
Bohnenkamp et al. [5] give a formal analysis of the probability that an address collision happens, i.e.
two hosts end up with the same address. They also analyse the expected run time until a (not necessaryly
valid) address is chosen. As our first case study we formalize their analysis in Isabelle/HOL.
Andova et al. [1] present a model-checking approach for discrete-time Markov reward chains and
apply it to the ZeroConf protocol as a case study. They support multiple reward structures and can
compute the probability based on multiple constraints on these reward structures. Kwiatkowska et al. [18]
have modelled this protocol as a probabilistic timed automata in PRISM. Both models include more
features of the actual protocol than the model by Bohnenkamp et al. [5] that we follow.
3.1 Description of address allocation
We give a short description of the model used in Bohnenkamp et al. [5]. The address allocation in
ZeroConf uses ARP (address resolution protocol) to detect if an address is in use or not. An ARP request
is sent to detect if a specific IPv4 address is already in use. When a host has the requested IPv4 address
it answers with an ARP response. ZeroConf allocates a new address as follows:
1. Select uniformly a random address in the range 169.254.1.0 to 169.254.254.255.
2. Send an ARP request to detect if the address is already in use.
3. When a host responds to the ARP request, the address is already taken and we need to start again
(go back to 1).
4. When no response arrives before a time limit r, we again send an ARP request. This is repeated N
times.
5. When no response arrived for N requests we assume our address is not in use and are finished.
This probabilistic process depends on two parameters: (1) The probability q that the random chosen
address is already taken; this probability depends on the number of hosts in the network and the number
of available addresses. (2) The probability p that either the ARP request or response is lost.
The Markov chain shown in Fig. 1 describes the address allocation from a global viewpoint. At Start
a new host is added to the network, it chooses an address and sends the first ARP request. There are two
alternatives.
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Start Probe 0 Probe 1 Probe N Error
Ok
q; r
1−q; r · (N +1)
p; r
1− p; 0
1− p; 0
1− p; 0
p; E
1; 0
1; 0
Figure 1: Markov chain of the ZeroConf protocol. The labels are annotated with P;T : the probability P
to take this edge and the elapsed time T .
• With probability 1− q the host chooses an unused address, the allocation is finished, the Markov
chain directly goes to Ok . Of course, the host does not know this, and still sends out N + 1 ARP
probes. Hence we associate the time cost r · (N +1) with this transition.
• With probability q the host chooses a used address and goes to the probing phase: In the Probe n
state it sends an ARP request and waits until r time units have passed, or until it receives an ARP
response from the address owner. With probability 1− p the host receives an ARP response and
needs to choose a new address—we go back to Start . With probability p this exchange fails and
we go to the next probe phase. After N +1 probes, the host assumes the chosen address is free. As
two hosts in the network end up with the same address we reached the Error state. The time cost
E models the cost to repair the double allocation. This might involve restarting a laptop.
3.2 Formal model of ZeroConf address allocation
The Isabelle/HOL model of the ZeroConf protocol describes the Markov chain in Fig. 1. We set up a
context containing the probe numbers (starting with 0), the probabilities p and q, and the costs r and E:
fixes N :: N and p q r E :: R
assumes 0 < p and p < 1 and 0 < q and q < 1
assumes 0≤ E and 0 ≤ r
In the following sections we assume that these fixed variables N, p, q, r, and E fulfill the above assump-
tions of the ZeroConf protocol.
To represent the states in the Markov chain we introduce a new datatype:
datatype zc-state = Start | Probe N | Ok | Error
We have the type zc-state with the distinct objects Start, Ok, Error, and Probe n for all n :: N. The valid
states S :: zc-state set are a restriction of this to only valid probe numbers. This also gives us a finite
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number of states.
S = {Start,Ok,Error}∪{Probe n | n ≤ N}
The final modeling step is to define the transition matrix τ :: zc-state→ zc-state→R and the cost function
ρ :: zc-state → zc-state → R. Both are defined by a case distinction on the current state and return the
zero function 0 which is updated at the states with non-zero transition probability or cost.
τ s = case s of Start ⇒ 0(Probe 0 := q,Ok := 1−q)
| Probe n ⇒ if n < N then 0(Probe (n+1) := p,Start := 1− p)
else 0(Error := p,Start := 1− p)
| Ok ⇒ 0(Ok := 1)
| Error ⇒ 0(Error := 1)
ρ s = case s of Start ⇒ 0(Probe 0 := r,Ok := r ∗ (N +1))
| Probe n ⇒ if n < N then 0(Probe (n+1) := r) else 0(Error := E)
| Ok ⇒ 0
| Error ⇒ 0
We need to prove that we actually defined a Markov chain: as a consequence, Isabelle/HOL is able to
provide the probabilities Prs A for each state s and path set A. For this we show that τ is a valid transition
matrix for a Markov chain on S , and ρ is a valid cost function:
theorem τ-DTMC: markov-reward-chain S τ ρ
To prove this we need to show that τ and ρ are non-negative for all states in S . And finally we need to
show that τ s is a distribution for all s in S , which is easy to show by using the helper lemma S -split:
lemma S -split: ∑
s∈S
f s = f Start+ f Ok+ f Error+ ∑
n≤N
f (Probe n)
3.3 Probability of an erroneous allocation
The correctness property we want to verify is that no collision happens, i.e. we want to compute the
probability that a protocol run ends in the Error state. The goal of this section is not only to show what
we proved, but to show how we proved it. Most of the proofs are automatic by rewriting and we do
not show the details. But we want to show the necessary lemmas and theorems needed to convince
Isabelle/HOL.
We define Perr :: zc-state → R to reason about the probability that a trace ω ends in the Error state
when we started in a state s:
Perr s = Pr s
(
ω. s·ω ∈ until S {Error}
)
Our final theorem will be to characterize Perr Start only in terms of the system parameters p, q and N.
The first obvious result is that when we are already in Error, we will stay in Error, and when we are
in Ok we will never reach Error:
lemma Perr-error: Perr Error = 1
lemma Perr-ok: Perr Ok = 0
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Perr-error is proved by rewriting: Error ·ω ∈ until S {Error} is always true. The Ok case is proved by
reachable (S \{Error}) Ok ⊆ {Ok}. Together with lemma S -split and these two lemmas we provide an
iterative lemma for Perr:
lemma Perr-iter:
s ∈ S =⇒ Perr s = τ s Start∗Perr Start+ τ s Error+∑n≤N τ s (Probe n)∗Perr (Probe n)
However this is a bad rewrite theorem, using it would result in non-termination of the rewrite engine. To
avoid this we derive rules for specific states:
lemma Perr-last-probe: Perr (Probe N) = p+(1− p)∗Perr Start
lemma Perr-start-iter: Perr Start = q∗Perr (Probe 0)
Our next step is to compute the probability to reach Error when we are in Probe n. This is the only
proof which is not done by a simple rewrite step, but it requires induction and two separate rewrite steps.
The induction is done over the number n of steps until we are in Error. To give the reader a better feeling
for what these proofs look like, here is the skeleton of the Isabelle proof:
lemma Perr-probe-iter: n ≤ N =⇒ Perr (Probe (N−n)) = pn+1 +(1− pn+1)∗Perr Start
proof (induct n)
case (n+1)
have Perr (Probe (N− (n+1))) = p∗ (pn+1 +(1− pn+1)∗Perr Start)+ (1− p)∗Perr Start
<proof>
also have · · ·= p(n+1)+1 +(1− p(n+1)+1)∗Perr Start
<proof>
finally show Perr (Probe (N− (n+1))) = p(n+1)+1 +(1− p(n+1)+1)∗Perr Start .
qed simp – The 0-case is a simple rewriting step with Perr-last-probe.
Together with Perr-start-iter we prove our final theorem:
theorem Perr-start: Perr Start = (q∗ pN+1)/(1−q∗ (1− pN+1))
With typical parameters for the ZeroConf protocol (16 hosts (q = 16/65024), 3 probe runs (N = 2)
and a probability of p = 0.01 to lose ARP packets) we compute (by rewriting) in Isabelle/HOL that the
probability to reach Error is below 1/1013:
theorem Perr Start ≤ 1/1013
3.4 Expected running time of an allocation run
Users are not only interested in a very low error probability but also in fast allocation time for network
address. Obviously there are runs which may take very long, but the probability for these runs are near
zero. So we want to verify that the average running time of an allocation run is in the time range of
milliseconds.
The running time of an allocation run Cfin :: S → R is modelled as the integral over the sum of all
costs ρ for each step in each run. The sum of all steps until either Ok or Error is reached is simply
cost-until:
Cfin s =
∫
ω
cost-until {Error,Ok} (s ·ω) dPr s
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J1
J3
J2
J4
J7
J6
J5
C1
C2
S
Figure 2: The established route J1− J4− J2− J7− J4−C1−S
In order to evaluate the integral we first show that it is finite. This is the case if cost-until {Error,Ok} is
finite almost everywhere. So we first show that almost every path reaches {Error,Ok}:
lemma AE-term: s ∈ S =⇒ AEsω. s ·ω ∈ until S {Error,Ok}
Using this we show an elementary form of Cfin in a similar way to Perr:
lemma Cfin-start: Cfin Start =
(q∗ (r+ pN+1 ∗E + r ∗ p∗ (1− pN)/(1− p))+ (1−q)∗ (r ∗N +1))/(1−q+q∗ pN+1)
With typical values (16 hosts, 3 probe runs, a probability of p = 0.01 to lose ARP packets, 2 ms for
an ARP round-trip (r = 0.002) and an error penalty of one hour (E = 3600)) we compute in Isabelle/HOL
that the average time to terminate is less or equal 0.007 s:
theorem Cfin Start ≤ 0.007
4 Case study: The Crowds protocol
The Crowds protocol described by Reiter and Rubin [22] is an anonymizing protocol. The goal is to
allow users to connect to servers anonymously. Neither the final server should know which user connects
to it, nor attackers collaborating in the network. The Crowds protocol establishes an anonymizing route
through a so called mix network: Each user (Reiter and Rubin name them jondo pronounced “John
Doe”) is itself participating in the mix network. When a jondo establishes a route, it first connects to
another random jondo which then decides based on a coin flip weighted with p f if it should connect to
the final server, or go through a further jondo, and so on. Figure 2 shows an established route through
the jondos J1− J4− J2− J7− J4−C1−S . There is no global information about a route available to the
participating jondos. For each connection a jondo only knows its immediate neighbours, but no other
previous or following jondo, so it may happen that a route is going through a loop, as seen in Fig. 2.
First, Reiter and Rubin [22] show that the server has no chance to guess the original sender. In
a second step they assume that some jondos collaborate to guess the jondo initiating the route. They
analyse the probability that a collaborating node is the successor of the initiating jondo. This analysis is
affected by the fact that the route may go through the initiating jondo multiple times. An analysis of the
Crowds protocol in PRISM, for specific sizes, has been conducted by Shmatikov [23].
Similar to the ZeroConf case, we only analyse the Markov chain having a global view on the protocol.
We could model the individual behaviour of jondos in Isabelle/HOL and show that this induces our
Markov chain model, but this is not in the scope of this paper.
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Start
Init J1
Init J2
Init J3
Mix J1
Mix J2
Mix J3
End
init J1
init J2
init J3 1
Probabilities:
p f /3
1/3
1− p f
Figure 3: Example Markov chain of the small Crowds network {J1, J2, J3}
4.1 Formalization of route establishment in the Crowds protocol
We concentrate on the probabilistic aspects of route establishment in the Crowds protocol. We assume a
set jondos of an arbitrary type α (which is just used to uniquely identify jondos), and a strict subset colls,
the collaborating attackers. A jondo decides with probability p f if it chooses another jondo as next step,
or if it connects directly to the server. The distribution of the initiating jondos is given by init. Naturally
the initiating jondo is not a collaborating jondo. In Isabelle this is expressed as the following context:
fixes jondos colls :: α set and p f :: R and init :: α→ R
assumes 0 < p f and p f < 1
assumes jondos 6= /0 and colls 6= /0 and finite jondos and colls ⊂ jondos
assumes ∀ j ∈ jondos. 0 ≤ init j and ∀ j ∈ colls. init j = 0 and ∑ j∈jondos init j = 1
The Markov chain has four different phases: start, the initial node, and the mixing phase, and finally
the end phase where the server is contacted. See Fig. 3 for a small example. Our formalization of Markov
chains requires a single start node, otherwise we could choose init as initial distribution. The type of the
state α c-state depends on the type of the jondos α.
datatype α c-state = Start | Init α |Mix α | End
Similar to the ZeroConf protocol not all possible values of c-state are necessary. We restrict them further
by only allowing non-collaborating jondos as initial jondos, and only elements from jondos participate
in the mixing phase. With this definition it is easy to show that the set of states S :: α c-state set is finite.
S = {Start}∪{Init j | j ∈ jondos \ colls}∪{Mix j | j ∈ jondos}∪{End}
Often we are interested in the jondo referenced by the current state. We introduce jondo-of ::
α c-state → α returning the jondo if we are in an initial or mixing state:
jondo-of s = case s of Init j⇒ j |Mix j⇒ j
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J2
J3
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J1
J2
J3
J4
J5
J6
J7
C1
C2
S
Start Init Mix0 Mix1 Mix2 Mix3 Mix4 End
Figure 4: The established route J1− J4− J3− J5− J4−C1−S
The transition matrix τ :: α c-state → α c-state → R is defined by a case distinction on all possible
transitions. The probability for steps from Start are given by the distribution of the initiating jondos init.
The first routing jondo is arbitrarily chosen, and the probability of going from a mixing state to a mixing
state is the product of p f to stay in the mixing phase and the probability 1/J for the next jondo. With
probability 1− p f the mixing state is finished and than the Markov chain stays in End. Figure 4 shows
an example path through the different phases.
J = |jondos|
H = |jondos \ colls|
τ s t = case (s, t) of (Start, Init j) ⇒ init j
| (Init j, Mix j′)⇒ 1/J
| (Mix j, Mix j′)⇒ p f /J
| (Mix j, End) ⇒ 1− p f
| (End, End) ⇒ 1
| _ ⇒ 0
This completes the definition of the Markov chain describing the route establishment in the Crowds
protocol. Finally we show that S and τ describe a discrete-time Markov chain:
theorem markov-chain S τ
4.2 The jondo contacting the server is independent from the initiating jondo
We define a number of path properties of our Markov chain. The functions len :: (N→ α c-state)→ N,
first-jondo :: (N→ α c-state)→ α and last-jondo :: (N→ α c-state)→ α operate on paths not containing
the Start element. len returns the length of the mixing phase, i.e. how many Mix states are in the path
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until End is reached, first-jondo is the initiating jondo, and last-jondo is the jondo contacting the server.
len ω= (LEAST n. ω n = End)−2
first-jondo ω= jondo-of (ω 0)
last-jondo ω= jondo-of (ω (len ω+1))
The path functions len, first-jondo and last-jondo are well defined on almost every path. The paths
in our Markov chain do not contain the Start element, so the paths start with an Init state. Hence for
almost every path we know that the first element is an initiating state, then for the next len elements we
have mixing states, and finally a tail of End states:
lemma AEStart ω. ω ∈ N→ S
lemma AEStart ω. ∃ j ∈ jondos \ colls. ω 0 = Init j
lemma AEStart ω. ∀i≤ len ω. ∃ j ∈ jondos. ω (i+1) = Mix j
lemma AEStart ω. ∀i > len ω. ω (i+1) = End
With this we can easily show that the jondo contacting the server is independent from the initiating jondo:
lemma
assumes l ∈ jondos and i ∈ jondos \ colls
shows Pr(ω. first-jondo ω= i∧ last-ncoll ω= l) =
Pr(ω. first-jondo ω= i)∗Pr(ω. last-ncoll ω= l)
4.3 Probability that initiating jondo contacts a collaborator
The attacker model assumes that the collaborators want to detect the initiator of a route. This is obviously
only possible if one of the collaborators is chosen as one of the mixing jondos. We have two goals: (1) If
the numbers of collaborators is small, the probability to contact a collaborator should be near zero. (2) We
want to analyse the probability that the initiating jondo directly contacts a collaborator. When we know
the ratio of collaborators to jondos, how can we adjust p f , so that this probability is less or equal to 1/2?
The random variable hit-colls :: (N → α c-state) → B is true if a collaborator participates in the
mixing phase, first-coll :: (N → α c-state) → N is the mixing phase in which the collaborator is hit,
and last-ncoll :: (N → α c-state) → α is the last non-collaborating jondo, i.e. the jondo contacting a
collaborator.
hit-colls ω= ∃n, j ∈ colls. ω n = Mix j
first-coll ω= (LEAST n. ∃ j ∈ colls. ω n = Mix j)−1
last-ncoll ω= jondo-of (ω (first-coll ω))
The property we want to check only makes sense if a collaborator participates in the mixing phase.
So we first prove the probability to hit a collaborator:
lemma PrStart(ω. hit-colls ω) = (1−H/J)/(1−H/J ∗ p f )
We already see that the probability to hit a collaborator goes to 0 if the number of collaborators and p f
stay constant and J −→ ∞. Then H/J −→ 1 and hence PrStart(ω. hit-colls ω) −→ 0. Thus our first goal
is satisfied.
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Additionally, we want to control the probability that the initiating jondo hits a collaborator. For
this, we compute the probability to have a fixed first and last non-collaborating jondo before we hit a
collaborator:
lemma P-first-jondo-last-ncoll :
assumes l ∈ jondos \ colls and i ∈ jondos \ colls
shows Pr(ω. first-jondo ω= i∧ last-ncoll ω= l | hit-colls ω) =
init i∗ (p f /J+(if i = l then 1−H/J ∗ p f else 0))
Note that the conditional probability does not divide by 0 because PrStart(ω. hit-colls ω) 6= 0 by the
previous lemma. By summing up over all possible non-collaborating jondos we show the probability
that the last non-collaborating jondo is the initiating jondo:
theorem PrStart(ω. first-jondo ω= last-ncoll ω | hit-colls ω) = 1− (H−1)/J ∗ p f
With this we can now enforce that the probability that the initiating jondo hits a collaborator is less or
equal to 12 :
lemma H > 1 ∧ J/(2∗ (H−1))≤ p f =⇒
PrStart(ω. first-jondo ω= last-ncoll ω | hit-colls ω)≤ 12
Reiter and Rubin [22] call this probably innocent. Because p f < 1 this is only possible if 1/2< (H−1)/J,
i.e. more than half of the jondos are non-collaborating. This meets our second goal.
4.4 Information gained by the collaborators
Obviously, in Isabelle/HOL we are not only restricted to state probabilities or expectations. For example,
for quantitative information flow analysis, similar to the analysis by Malacaria [20], we are interested
in the mutual information Is(X;Y) between two random variables X and Y . The mutual information is
formalized in Isabelle/HOL using the Radon-Nikodým derivative. However, we know that if X and Y are
simple functions, i.e. functions with a finite range, then Is(X;Y) can be computed in the known discrete
way:
lemma simple-functions X =⇒ simple-functions Y =⇒
Is(X;Y) = ∑(x,y)∈{(Xx,Yx)|x.x∈Ω} .Prs(ω. X ω= x∧Y ω= y)∗
log2
(
Prs(ω. X ω= x∧Y ω= y)/(Prs(ω. X ω= x)∗Prs(ω. Y ω= y))
)
We are only interested in runs which hit a collaborator. To use mutual information with this restriction
we introduce the conditional probability Prhit-colls , with the condition that each run hits a collaborator. Its
characteristic property (we omit the technical definition) is
lemma measurables P =⇒ Prhit-colls(ω. P ω) = PrStart(ω. P ω | hit-colls ω)
With this property and lemma P-first-jondo-last-ncoll we can now show an upper bound for the infor-
mation flow:
theorem Ihit-colls(first-jondo; last-ncoll)≤ (1− (H−1)/J ∗ p f )∗ log2 H
This supports the intuitive understanding that the information the attackers can gain is restricted by the
probability that the initiating jondo is the jondo directly contacting a collaborator.
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5 Related Work
There is already some work to verify parametric probabilistic models. Hermanns et al. [10] implement
a probabilistic variant of counterexample-guided abstraction refinement (CEGAR). They handle infinite
state spaces by breaking them up into finite partitions. Hahn et al. [8] allows parametric transition
probabilities. The number of states is still fixed, but the transition probabilities are rational functions over
parameter variables. Katoen et al. [16] present a method to generate and use quantitative invariants for
linear probabilistic programs. Their motivation is to use these invariants to augment interactive proofs.
Now we survey other work that models probabilistic systems in an interactive theorem prover.
We build directly on the formalization of Markov chain theory developed for our verification of pCTL
model checking [12], which builds on a formalization of measure theory [11]. Ultimately, all of the work
cited in this section builds on the work of Hurd (see below). However, instead of Hurd’s probability
space N→ B we have a probability space on arbitrary functions. This allows for a natural formalization
of Markov chains over arbitrary state spaces and needs no encoding into booleans.
The formalization of probability theory in HOL starts with Hurd’s thesis [13]. He introduces mea-
sure theory, proves Caratheodory’s theorem about the existence of measure spaces and uses it to in-
troduce a probability space on infinite boolean sequences. He defines concrete random variables with
Bernoulli or uniform distribution. Using this work he also analyses a symmetric simple random walk.
Hasan et al. [9] formalize the analysis of continuous random variables on Hurd’s probability space. How-
ever, their work is quite different from ours in that they do not employ Markov chains. Based on Hurd’s
work, Liu et al. [19] define when a stochastic process is a Markov chain. Their theory does not provide
everything we need: it is restricted to stochastic processes on Hurd’s probability space N→ B and does
not construct the path space of Markov chains defined by transition probabilities. Coble [7] formalizes
information theory on finite probability spaces. He applies it to a quantitative information flow analysis
of the Dining Cryptographers protocol. Hurd et al. [14] in HOL4 and Audebaud and Paulin-Mohring [2]
in Coq formalize semantics of probabilistic programs. Both reason about the probability of program
termination and only allow discrete distributions for the result values.
6 Conclusion
The formalizations are available in the Archive of Formal Proofs [15]. For the ZeroConf protocol the
formalization was done in a couple of days and required approx. 260 lines of Isabelle/HOL theory. The
Crowds protocol requires approx. 1060 lines of Isabelle/HOL theory and it took one person a couple of
weeks to verify. The time necessary for the verification includes finding an estimation for the information
gained when a collaborator is hit. The probabilities we verified for the ZeroConf protocol and the Crowds
protocol are expressible as PCTL formulas. However this is not a restriction of Isabelle/HOL. We can
express ω-regular properties or multiple reward structures easily in higher-order logic.
Our future goals include more powerful models like Markov decision processes and continuous-time
models but also the certification of probabilistic model checker runs in Isabelle/HOL.
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